I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional neoclassical economics takes a particular view of the world. It presumes the world is characterized by a single, stable equilibrium. For example, markets have single, stable equilibriums determined by supply and demand. If there is a shock to the system, countervailing forces come into effect to restore equilibrium. Neoclassical growth theory, for example, implies that there is a steady state equilibrium which can be determined once certain fundamental variables are known (population growth rate, savings, rate of technological change). At this steady state, the rates of growth of capital, augmented (by technical innovation) labour, and output grow at the same rate. If an economy should be below the steady state, it will converge to the steady state (absolute convergence). Of course, if the fundamental factors vary from country to country (savings rates differ, population growth rates differ, and or rates of technological change differ), then each economy will have its own steady state and each country will converge to its own steady state (conditional convergence).
The last possibility indicates that there may be many equilibriums, conditional on the values of the key variables. However, if labour, capital, and knowledge are free to move from nation to nation, then steady states for all countries should converge to a common value and absolute convergence once again emerges. Under some conditions, free trade in goods may achieve the same results. Thus, multiple equilibriums would emerge only if there are impediments to the flow of capital, labour, and/or technology. These impediments are often attributed to policy barriers imposed by national Governments, such as barriers to foreign investment, the flow of technology, migration, and free trade. Thus, poorer countries fail to catch up in this scenario as a result of bad policy. Once the policy is corrected, economic convergence occurs. However, the above perspective presumes that markets exist and are efficient. When this is not true, then another perspective on the world emerges. There may be multiple equilibriums, some stable, some not stable. Stable high-income and low-income equilibriums imply that convergence, of either the conditional or absolute variety, will not occur. Due to accidents of history, a country can be caught in a low-level trap and thus be unable, on its own, to obtain a high-income level equilibrium.
There are a variety of trap type models, some of which will be reviewed in the next section of the paper. In this paper, the focus will be on developing a poverty trap model, a multiple equilibriums model, in which the level of State effectiveness in reducing poverty will be the key variable. That is, there are multiple equilibriums in the sense that there is a high-level equilibrium at which the State is effective in promoting pro-poor policies which enhance or empower the poor. There is also a low-level equilibrium at which the State is ineffective at promoting pro-poor policies which enhance the position of the poor. The focus will then be on how to alter the structural characteristics of the model so as to make the low-level equilibrium unstable. It will be argued that the existence or lack of existence of a pool or backlog of agricultural technology will be a key structural factor. The role of agriculture in reducing poverty will be discussed in the second section of the paper, along with a brief literature review of multiple equilibriums models.
The actual model will be developed in section III. Section IV will illustrate the workings of the model by examining the policies carried out by the Japanese in Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea (both were colonies of Japan prior to the Second World War). The experiences of these countries will be compared to that of South-East Asia. Finally, section V gives a summary of the paper and draws policy implications for today's developing nations.
II. AGRICULTURE, POVERTY AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUMS
Rapid economic development has become a characteristic of much of East Asia. Specifically, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China have all experienced very rapid rates of overall economic growth. After the Second World War, Japan experienced rates of growth that, by historical standards, seemed miraculous in nature, and poverty fell very rapidly. The Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China had, in many ways, very similar experiences. Both achieved rapid rates of growth and dramatic reductions in poverty. China seems an extension of the process with overall growth rates exceeding that achieved by the other three during their period of high growth, again accompanied by rapid reductions (especially in the early years of the growth process) in poverty.
A common factor in the convergence of these countries involves the rapid growth of labour-intensive manufactured goods, oriented towards foreign markets via rapid export growth. What is less commonly acknowledged is the role which agriculture has played. In Japan, rapid agricultural growth was achieved during the latter part of the Tokugawa period (1600-1863) and the early part of the pre-war period . This rapid agricultural growth provided the income stimulus leading to rapid expansion of labour-intensive, rural based manufacturing. In terms of agricultural growth, from 1876 to 1938 agricultural output grew at an average rate of 1.6 per cent and total productivity at a rate of 1.2 per cent annually (Yamada and Hayami, 1979) . Achieving these rates of growth involved significant investment in agriculture. After the Second World War, rapid growth in agriculture was once again achieved via investment in agriculture. Output grew at 3.2 per cent and productivity at 3.6 per cent from 1955 to 1965 (Yamada and Hayami, 1979) .
This pattern was maintained in the experiences of both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. Prior to the Second World War, both were colonies of Japan, which used them as a source of primary products, both rice and sugar, for the homeland. Thus, the Japanese made significant investments involving the creation of research and extension systems, rapid expansion of irrigation, and the creation of an extensive system of roads and other forms of public infrastructure in the countryside. These programmes to raise overall agricultural productivity were indeed very successful, although much more so in Taiwan Province of China than in the Republic of Korea. In Taiwan Province of China from 1923 to 1937, agricultural growth rose to an annual rate of 4.1 per cent, with approximately 41 per cent of that output growth due to increases in productivity (Lee and Chen, 1979) . In the Republic of Korea, the growth in agricultural production reached 1.62 per cent per year for the period 1930 to 1939 (Ban, 1979) , with all of the growth due to input accumulation. After the Second World War, both regions continued to invest significant resources into agriculture, at least in the early part of the time period, which resulted in continued rapid agricultural growth. From 1946 to 1970, output in Taiwan Province of China grew at an annual rate of 5.6 per cent, while productivity grew at 3.9 per cent annually (Lee and Chen, 1979) . In the Republic of Korea from 1953 to 1969, output grew at an annual rate of 4.36 per cent while productivity grew by about 2 per cent (Ban, 1979) .
The rapid rate of agricultural growth achieved in all three regions is thought to have been critical in the rapid growth of the area. Thorbecke and Wan (2004) argue that rapid agricultural growth provided the critical initial factor in overall rapid economic growth. The agricultural sector provided relatively cheap food to the modern sector while at the same time serving as a source of surplus, which was, in turn, available for investment. Ultimately, it also served as a source of labour for the expansion of the modern sector. However, the expansion of modern sector manufacturing did not necessarily imply rapid urbanization. For at least two of the regions (Japan and Taiwan Province of China), the rapid agricultural growth was accompanied by rapid growth in small-scale labour-intensive manufacturing based in rural areas (Headey, Bezemer and Hazell, 2008) . This provided opportunities for farm families to become more broadly entrepreneurial in the sense that they could invest their growing agricultural surplus in small-scale manufacturing activities. Thus, farmers became increasingly connected with manufacturing.
The ultimate result of this rural-based growth was a process in which absolute poverty fell very rapidly and the relative distribution of income did not deteriorate. In fact, Campos and Root (1996) argued that East Asia's success in terms of long-term growth was indeed due to the fact that the benefits of growth were widely shared across groups within each country.
The recent growth experience of China seems to be a process very similar, at least in part, to that which occurred in East Asia. Rapid growth began in China with the reforms of the late 1970s. This created the foundations for a growth process which led to a dramatic reduction in poverty. Specifically, in 1981 two out of three mainland Chinese lived in poverty, but, by 2004, less than one in ten was poor. The rate of poverty reduction from 1981 to 2004 was about 1.9 per cent per year (Ravallion, 2009 ).
Many have argued that it was through trade and foreign investment that China was able to achieve such a rapid reduction in poverty. However, this does not seem to be the case. Ravallion (2009) argues that two thirds of the decline in the number of people living under $1/day for the whole time period occurred between 1981 and 1987. The rapid growth in foreign investment in China and the growth of exports occurred later. Ravallion (2009) argues that "the 'heavy lifting' in reducing the numbers of poor in the early stages of China's reform process was done by the rural economy" (Ravallion, 2009, p. 305) . These reforms involved the development of the household responsibility system. Prior to the late 1970s, agriculture was organized into large communal or collective farms. Markets were not utilized, and material incentives to stimulate intensity of effort were quite limited. The household responsibility system basically restored family farming and allowed these new family farms to sell an increasing proportion of its output through markets. The rapid growth in agricultural income that followed stimulated the development of small-scale, labour-intensive manufacturing firms (TVE, township and village enterprises) located in rural areas. These two developments resulted in a dramatic reduction in absolute poverty. Ravallion and Chen (2007) found that the pattern of growth influenced inequality. Inequality fell as a result of agricultural growth, inequality in both rural and urban areas. However, since the 1980s the agricultural sectors rate of growth has declined dramatically. As a result, the degree of inequality has subsequently increased. However, the moral of the story remains, dramatic reductions in poverty in East Asia and China have been the result of a growth process based on rapid productivity growth in agriculture. The growth "miracles" in these regions seem to have an agricultural base to them.
Within this context, one would think multiple equilibriums, poverty trap models would be very useful in explaining sudden explosions of growth. Indeed, such theories have been used to analyse these experiences, especially that of East Asia. However, most of these models completely ignore the agricultural sector and are focused on explaining growth, not poverty reduction. While the latter generally follows from the former, this is not always the case.
Poverty trap models are not recent theoretical developments. After the Second World War, the initial theorizing about the development process was usually in the form of some sort of trap analysis. The work of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) comes to mind. He argued that, in economically isolated, poor regions, it was unlikely that economic development could occur. One firm contemplating constructing a new factory would find the market quite limited implying that it would not likely be profitable. However, if a number of individual firms producing different things could be established simultaneously, then each could serve as a market for the others. The likelihood of the firms being profitable is much higher. An external coordinating force would be necessary to bring about the integrated expansion. Thus, two equilibriums would exist, one a low-level trap in which no single firm would invest and the other a high-income equilibrium in which coordinated simultaneous investment would occur. This approach presumes that trade (exporting) is not an option and capital market failure occurs. A modern, formalized version of this type of model has been provided in the work of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) .
Ragnar Nurkse (1953) argued that there is a vicious circle of poverty. In a market where incomes are low, there are few profitable opportunities for investment, while in a market where incomes are high, there are many such opportunities. In the former equilibrium, there will be little investment, and in the latter significant accumulation of capital. Thus, there are two equilibriums, with the low-income equilibrium representing accidents of history and geography.
A modern version of the Nurkse model is provided by the work of Rodrik (1996) . He assumes two types of final goods: simple and complex. The simple good is produced without the use of intermediate goods and with the use of lots of labour and land. The complex good uses lots of intermediate goods. Further, it is assumed that the greater the variety of intermediate goods utilized, the higher is the overall productivity in the complex good industry (increasing returns). Finally, he assumes that intermediate goods are produced under conditions of increasing returns or falling costs.
In this context, two equilibriums emerge. An economy that finds itself in an equilibrium producing the simple final good will utilize few intermediate goods, intermediate goods will be very expensive to produce, thus firms will not find it profitable to try to establish production of complex final goods, since these are intensive in the use of intermediate goods. However, the economy that, for reasons of history, finds itself producing the technologically complex final good will utilize many intermediate goods, they will be cheap, and thus firms will find it profitable to become increasingly complex. Thus, shallowness in the markets for intermediate goods (assuming they cannot be costlessly imported) implies that a country can become locked into the production of simple, manufactured goods.
There are many other examples of growth or development trap models in the literature. However, almost all of these models focus on growth and development equilibriums and these models do not incorporate agriculture in a meaningful way. The next section will develop a simple model focused on poverty reduction emphasizing the key role that agriculture and agricultural technology can play. Ravallion (2009) has developed a very simple threshold model of State effectiveness in reducing poverty. He assumes that the extent to which a country adopts pro-poor policies is dependent upon the extent of the empowerment of the poor, with the effect subject to diminishing returns. The empowerment of the poor is the extent to which the poor can influence policymaking. One could argue that this is a mainly political relationship represented by a production function that could be written as:
III. A SIMPLE MODEL
( 1) Pro-Poor Policy Choice = f(Empowerment of Poor).
As the political empowerment of the poor increases, policies are likely to be more pro-poor in nature. Technological innovation in this context would be represented by the development or evolution of institutions which enhance the effectiveness of the poor in influencing policy choice so that, for any given level of empowerment for the poor, greater pro-poor policy choice emerges. One can think that a shift from authoritarian political institutions to democratic institutions will, in a poor country, increase the effectiveness of creating pro-poor policies from any given level of poor empowerment. This represents political or institutional innovation.
Alternatively, one can imagine a production/function type of relationship between pro-poor policies and empowerment, subject to diminishing returns. One would write the relationship as: (2) Empowerment of Poor = f(Pro-Poor Policies)
The greater the number of pro-poor policies, leading to greater economic productivity and wealth for the poor, the greater the empowerment of the poor. In this case, technological innovation would increase the amount of pro-poor empowerment that results from any given level of pro-poor policies. One can think of this as representing technological as opposed to political innovation. If most of the poor earn their living in agriculture, then broad-based, labour-using (-intensive) technologies will dramatically increase the productivity (and income) of the poor, thus, empowering them. These ideas are illustrated in figure 1.
The political relationship between empowerment and pro-poor policies is represented by the curve CBA. The technological relationship between pro-poor policies and the empowerment of the poor is represented by the curve DBA. As one can see, there are three potential equilibriums, two of which are stable and the third unstable. The two stable equilibriums are the origin 0 and point A, while B represents the unstable equilibrium. At a point to the south-west of B, the level of empowerment of the poor is too low to generate any pro-poor policies, and any existing pro-poor policies cannot sustain political empowerment of the poor. Both fall to the origin. This is the ineffective State, which cannot design or carry out effectively any policy aimed at enhancing the wealth of the poor. At point B, a small increase in either empowerment of the poor or pro-poor policies causes a sustained increase of both to point A. This is an effective State where the poor are empowered and pro-poor policies are achieved. Thus, ineffective States are States trapped in the low level equilibrium, effective States are in the high level equilibrium.
How does a nation escape from the ineffective, low-level equilibrium? In these types of models a big push in terms of pro-poor policies and/or empowerment of the poor can get a nation to point A. But where are the resources for such a big push to come from? An alternative would be to change the underlying structure of the model. One avenue to do so would be via political reform, usually including the establishment of democracy and creating institutions of accountability and trust. This would represent political or institutional innovation shifting the curve CBA up and to the left. As a result, point B would move in a south-westerly direction until the low-level, ineffective State equilibrium disappears. Any level of political empowerment for the poor or any small increase in such empowerment (from zero) will set off a cumulative causation process of rising empowerment and increasingly pro-poor policies: the development of an effective State. Thus, political reform can change the underlying structure of the model. Political reform is a process which has been pushed by international agencies. Much economic literature has been devoted to showing that such institutional reform can result in an effective State. However, in practice, achieving such institutional reform has proven very difficult. There is information as to what sorts of institutions promote the interests of the poor, but it is very difficult to create such institutions. Economics has not shed much light on this subject.
There is an alternative path to the establishment of an effective State. That would be technical innovation that shifts DBA down and to the right. Thus, point B would move down until the stable, low-level trap disappears. Such a shift would mean that any pro-poor policy would become better or more effective at producing poor empowerment and vice versa. Let's flesh this idea out a bit.
The literature concerning East Asia and China reviewed earlier focused on the idea that investment in infrastructure and technological development in agriculture yielded pro-poor type growth. The experiences of East Asia and China, at least initially, indicate that growth in agriculture is important for an equitable development process. In the context of the model developed in this section, pro-poor policies (the vertical axis in figure 1) represent policies focused on promoting agricultural growth. Thus, as one moves up the vertical axis, increasing amounts of resources are devoted to enhancing agricultural investment. As agricultural growth occurs, this enhances the incomes of individuals in this sector via direct growth in crop production and the expansion of rural-based manufacturing activity. Since the bulk of the poor reside in the rural sector, rising income in this sector increases the ability of the poor to influence policy. The argument is that growth in the income of the poor increases their ability to promote additional pro-poor policies, empowerment of the poor occurs (movement from left to right along the horizontal axis in figure 1 ).
Of course, the structure of land ownership influences the ability of pro-poor (pro-agriculture) policies to empower the poor. For example, land reform which reduces the inequality in the distribution of land will shift the curve DBA down and to the right. This institutional innovation increases the productivity of any pro-poor (pro-agriculture) policies. That is, an equitable distribution of land implies greater empowerment of the poor through agricultural investment. For any given level of pro-poor policy, there would be greater empowerment of the poor.
The conclusion is that significant land reform could provide the foundation for a shift from an ineffective State equilibrium to an effective State equilibrium (point A). However, land reforms are extremely difficult to carry out. So this is likely to be possible only after a significant amount of empowerment of the poor has already occurred, further enhancing the possibility of State effectiveness.
Are there other ways to shift the DBA curves outward? Remember, one can think of this as a kind of production function. Empowerment of the poor is produced via pro-poor investment. Technological innovation would increase the productivity of pro-poor (pro-agriculture) investment. More clearly, the development of new broad-based, labour-intensive agricultural technologies will shift DBA outward and down. With such new agricultural technologies, the incomes of the poor would be significantly increased, resulting in a significant increase in their empowerment.
Let's contrast two different situations: first, a nation in which the trap situation exists and there is no potential for technical innovation in agriculture. In this case, the State will be stuck in the ineffective equilibrium (original figure 1). Contrast this with a country or region in which there is a large backlog of agricultural technology with the potential to dramatically raise agricultural productivity and thus significantly empower the poor. In this case, the ineffective State equilibrium would cease to exist. Thus, any small increase in pro-poor policy or poor empowerment will set off a cumulative causation process in which the State will increasingly become effective at reducing poverty. Thus, the key factor is whether or not a significant backlog of potential technology exists.
However, this is only part of the story. One must ask what incentive does the State have to become effective at reducing poverty? In other words, what is it about a backlog of agricultural technology that drives the State to become more effective? Investments in agriculture will enhance the wealth and influence of the poor, ceteris paribus. But what does the State gain in this process? Figure 1 shows the macroeconomics of the trap model, but now one must also understand the microeconomics of such a model.
How does increased productivity in agriculture cause the ruling elite of the State to seek to incorporate the interests of the poor into policymaking and how does the ruling elite benefit from this? Answers to these questions are presented by the recent work of Bromley (2008) . In analysing the weakness of African States, he takes a novel approach. He argues that the ruling elite will seek to enhance the power of the State only if it pays to do so. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, it does not benefit the ruling elite to extend its institutional infrastructure into the hinterland to strengthen its links to the countryside. Thus the State's influence is mainly limited to urban areas and thus, from the outside, the State appears to be weak.
What is the benefit to the State of extending its institutional structure into the countryside? It would seem that revenue-or potential revenue-is the key. States and ruling elites need revenue in order to maintain their grip on society. If there is little potential to extract revenue from rural areas (where the poor live), then there will be little incentive to incorporate the rural population into the State. Thus, the rural poor will not be empowered.
Alternatively, the State may very well be interested in extending its institutions into the countryside if there is the potential to earn tax revenue. This potential will exist if there is a significant backlog of technology available for immediate use. This increased productivity would generate not only a rise in farm incomes, but it would also stimulate the growth in incomes generated by rural manufacturing. The possible extraction of some of this revenue would require that the State establish an institutional structure for diffusing the technology and collecting the revenue. However, in order to extract the revenue, the State will, in turn, have to create quasi-voluntary compliance, in the words of Levi (1989) . In order for the State be able to collect revenue, the potential source of that revenue must be willing to comply in return for other things (services). One might at this point argue that the State could just use coercion to extract revenue from the countryside, and, indeed, history provides many such examples. However, two considerations make coercion a very inefficient mechanism for collecting revenue unless it is accompanied by quasi-voluntary compliance: first, coercion without the provision of services in return will lead farmers to reduce their efforts at production, leading to a reduction in tax revenue possibilities over time; second, applying coercion to a large number of small producers is a very time-consuming and costly process. For these reasons, quasi-voluntary compliance is necessary for efficient revenue collection.
The simple logic of the above is as follows. The existence of a significant backlog of agricultural technology implies that, in figure 1 , the potential DBA curve is shifted dramatically to the right and downward. The motivation to transform this from potential to actual is provided by the incentives facing the ruling elite. The attraction of the potential significant increase in revenue for the State flowing from increased agricultural productivity leads the State to extend itself into the countryside. The dependence upon the countryside increases, and, thus, the State must become more sensitive to their interests. This is very similar to Moore's (2001) notion of earned income. He has argued that a State that earns its revenue is a State that takes into account the interests of its revenue sources. A State earns its income if it builds an institutional infrastructure extending throughout society to enable it to collect revenue and must provide services in return to ensure quasi-voluntary compliance (reciprocity).
The above analysis is rather simplistic in its discussion of agricultural technology. Certainly, many less developed countries operate inside the technological frontier with respect to agricultural technology. They are using technologies which are not the most productive. However, most agricultural technology is location-and climate-dependent. That is, the technology works best only in particular locations and under specific climatic conditions. Working at other locations or under different climatic conditions requires adaptation at the local level and efforts must then be exerted to extend the technology throughout the rural areas. Thus, local resources must be utilized to activate the technology.
Whether such local efforts will be made is, of course, dependent on the potential productivity of the technology. If it is high, then the potential return to the State via revenue from taxation will also be high. However, in many cases this will likely not be enough. Doner, Ritchie, and Slater (2005) provide some valuable insight on this issue. Although their work is more broadly focused on the issue of how developmental states evolve, it is still quite relevant to the issues discussed here. They argue that, the greater the extent to which States are characterized by systematic vulnerability, the more likely they are to become effective at promoting economic development. The systematic vulnerability of a State is the result of "the simultaneous interplay of three separate constraints: (1) broad coalition commitments, (2) scarce resource endowments, and (3) severe security threats" (Doner, Ritchie, and Slater, 2005, p. 329) . Simply, the more broadly based the ruling elite's coalition, the more likely it is that it will pursue policies enhancing the welfare of society. If the survival of the ruling elite is threatened, it focuses the attention of the elite on policies which aim at increasing the economic, political and perhaps military strength of the society. Finally, if resources for State revenue are difficult to come by, then the ruling elite must enhance productivity in order to enhance their own revenue stream. Alternatively, where revenue sources are more readily available (from natural resource taxation), if there are few threats to the political survival of the elite, and the elite are dependent upon a narrow coalition, then it is highly unlikely that the State will pursue productivity growth. Instead, patron-client politics are likely to prevail.
The argument of this paper is consistent with the analysis presented in the previous paragraph. Pro-poor economic development is likely to be pursued if the only source of revenue for the State is the taxing of household farming units (there is no easy access to sources of revenue via natural resources) and there is the potential for rapid growth in productivity. If household farms make up the bulk of the rural population, then the ruling elite's supporting coalition will be broadly based. The last factor-the existence of significant threats to the ruling elite-is a key factor focusing attention on policies aimed at enhancing overall agricultural productivity. This last factor seems to be important in terms of motivating the ruling elite to adapt and activate new technology.
With these ideas in mind, the next section will analyse the colonial experience of Taiwan Province of China and Korea under Japanese rule. This will then be compared to the colonial experience of South-East Asia. In the case of Taiwan Province of China and Korea, the colonization process was more developmental. It will be argued that these experiences illustrate the workings of the model outlined in this section.
IV. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE OF TAIWAN PROVINCE OF CHINA IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF KOREA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA
According to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) , there are two types of administrative or State structures that colonial powers can construct in their colonies. Extractive States are those whose major purpose is to extract wealth from the colony as quickly as possible. The only investments that are made are for the rapid transport of resources and the creation of a level of security high enough to protect this process. As a result, few institutions are constructed to protect property rights for society at large or provide infrastructure (except that which is necessary for rapid resource extraction). There is also little investment in the education of the native population.
At the other end of the scale are developmental colonies. Institutions for the protection of property rights in general are provided, construction of infrastructure is widespread, and low levels (primary) of education are provided. This is not the result of the concern of the colonial power for those colonized; it is an unexpected by-product of attempts by the colonial power to benefit from the colony.
What determines which type of colony that will be created? Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that this is dependent on mortality rates expected by prospective settlers. If mortality rates are high, few will settle in the colony, the emphasis will be on the short run, and the focus will be on the quick extraction of resources. Alternatively, when mortality rates are low, colonists will settle in large numbers, bringing their institutional structure with them. The emphasis will be on longer-term investments. These settler colonies (such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States) are likely to be much more developmental.
This analytical perspective does not really work when looking at Korea and Taiwan Province of China as colonized by Japan. The mortality rates facing Japanese colonists in these two colonies were low. However, these were not settler colonies. Initially, there was some emphasis on using these colonies as a place to settle part of the dense Japanese population, and some settlement did occur, but not on a very large scale. The manufacturing sectors were dominated by the Japanese, but the rural sectors remained firmly in the hands of the indigenous population. These were not settlement colonies.
What was it, then, that guided the Government of Japan in terms of policies for its two colonies? Would Japan construct extractive or developmental colonies? As it turns out, the colonies were more developmentally oriented. During both the Tokugawa (1600-1868) and the Meiji (1868-1917) periods, Japan had achieved significant growth in domestic agricultural productivity. During the late Tokugawa period, farmers had experimented with new techniques and the cross-breeding of seeds. This was a farm-based, pragmatic and evolutionary process of technological development which occurred over a long period of time. Because of the constraints imposed by feudalism, much of this technology remained localized, with little diffusion throughout Japan. In many cases, feudal lords prohibited the export of improved seeds or cultivating methods from their territories. "Although the Tokugawa period was characterized by significant growth in agricultural productivity, Japanese agriculture entered the Meiji period with a substantial backlog of unexploited, indigenous technology" (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) .
The Tokugawa period was brought to an abrupt close by the arrival of the United States Navy off the coast of Japan. This posed a significant threat to the survival of Japan as an independent entity. The upheaval that followed led to the replacement of the Japanese feudal elite by a new elite (the Meiji Restoration), whose focus, by necessity, would be on promoting rapid economic development, for it was only through this development that Japan could amass the political power necessary to preserve its independence. This new elite faced a threat, depended on an agricultural sector made up of the bulk of the population, and had a technological backlog to draw upon.
With the Meiji Restoration, the old feudal order collapsed and the newly established ruling elite sought to establish the institutions of a modern nation State. Fiefdoms were eliminated, and national communication was fostered. The old feudal class structure ceased to exist. The ruling elite reformed the land tax law, converting it from payment in kind to payment in cash. In addition, the rights of ownership were secured and the land tax was formalized. A system of experiment stations was established along with an extension system composed of veteran farmers. The latter were utilized to spread technical innovation. There had been significant investment in irrigation during the Tokugawa period; this sort of investment was carried on throughout the Meiji period as well.
As a result of the above, from 1880 to 1900, agricultural output grew at a rate of 1.6 per cent and productivity at 1.2 per cent. From 1904 to 1918, these numbers became, respectively, 2.0 per cent and 1.5 per cent. By historical standards, this was rapid growth (Yamada and Hayami, 1979) . Improved productivity played a large role.
However, in the second decade of the twentieth century, the technological backlog was approaching exhaustion. The Government had significantly invested in its agricultural experimentation and extension system and crop breeding was being extensively carried out. Although this research would eventually lead to major sources of new technology, this would not occur until the mid-1930s. As a result, Japan faced a population-food problem just before the First World War. Rising food (rice) prices caused serious social disruption in urban areas, eventually resulting in the rice riots of 1918. These riots, which took place in all of the major cities of Japan, threatened the survival of the Japanese ruling elite. As a result, Japan sought to use its colonies as a source of rice for the homeland (Hayami and Ruttan 1985) , the goal being to dampen any price increase.
An extractive colonization process would have had the Japanese colonial governments in Taiwan Province of China (then called Formosa) and Korea seek to extract as much rice (and other primary commodities) as quickly as possible. This would have dampened rice prices in Japan, allowing research on the mainland to create the technologies necessary to finance the mainland's economic growth. However, the Japanese colonial State chose a different route.
The technologies that had been developed in the Tokugawa and early Meiji period could be easily transferred to the environment of Taiwan Province of China, but much less so for Korea. In other words, significant modification of the technology was not necessary in Taiwan Province of China. Thus, the colonial government in Taiwan Province of China had a significant backlog of agricultural technology that could be relatively easily utilized, while in the Republic of Korea this was less so. In terms of the model developed in the previous section, DBA shifted downward and to the right. This made it easier to create a process of cumulative causation, with pro-poor policies having a significant impact on pro-poor influence on policymaking, leading to more pro-poor growth, etc. The term "pro-poor" is understood to mean pro-agriculture, as the bulk of the poor work in agriculture.
The main motivation for the colonial elite to undertake pro-poor (proagriculture) policies was the fact that the Japanese ruling elite in both colonies was faced with a fundamental fiscal difficulty. In order to provide for a flow of rice from the colonies to the mainland, investments had to be made in infrastructure: irrigation, roads and communication. In order to pay for these investments, revenue was needed. This revenue could only be collected by extending the State's administrative and institutional structure into the countryside. However, to encourage quasi-voluntary compliance, the ruling elite had to provide services (public investment) in return. In Moore's (2001) terms, the ruling colonial elite in Taiwan Province of China and Korea depended on earned income. In order to generate revenue, they had to generate agricultural growth.
The investments made by the ruling colonial elite yielded significant growth in the agricultural sector (especially in Taiwan Province of China) and substantial structural change, i.e. significant expansion of non-agricultural sectors. It was the significant technological backlog that made it attractive to transfer such technology to the colonies. As pointed out above, these investments in technology transfer resulted in rapid growth rates in agricultural production. This also resulted in substantial structural change, with manufacturing activities increasing as a share of total output. These activities provided additional employment opportunities, additional sources of income.
One might argue that, while development was occurring during the colonial period and this growth was agriculturally based, this does not mean that such growth was in any way pro-poor. Although the bulk of the poor in these two colonies certainly resided in and earned their income in the agricultural sector, that does not mean that they benefited. After all, the colonial power had no direct interest in the poor farmers benefiting from agricultural growth.
However, there is a fundamental reason why the colonial elite would follow policies which would indeed end up benefiting the poor inadvertently. The ruling colonial elite had to earn its revenue via tax collection. One of the initial policies followed by the colonial State in both territories was to conduct a land survey, determine ownership and grant property rights to the owners. This was necessary in order to create an effective institutional structure for assessing and collecting the land tax, which was initially the dominant source of revenue. As productivity in agriculture grew, via investment, revenue would increase. If agriculture prospered, so did the ruling colonial elite. However, in order to create quasi-voluntary compliance, there must be reciprocity. That is, if the State seeks to extract revenue, it must provide not only services in return, but also incentives for farmers to adapt the new technologies. More specifically, farmers must benefit from utilizing new technologies if they are to be effectively applied. Thus, the poor, as agricultural producers, must gain in the process.
Evidence supporting this conclusion is now readily available. From 1910 to 1939, real wages in Taiwan Province of China increased at an annual rate of 1.3 per cent a year. Data imply that, up to the 1930s, per capita consumption was rising. "In the colonial period the Taiwanese also consumed a steadily expanding flow of publicly financed services, among which those related to public health and education were most important and had far reaching consequences. From 1906 to 1936-40 the mean life expectancy of Taiwanese males at birth increased by 13.4 years to 41.1 and that of Taiwanese females by 16.7 years to 45.7" (Ho, 1978) . In terms of education, by 1930-31, 33 per cent of school age children attended school and by 1943-44 this grew to 71 per cent (Ho, 1978) .
A different story emerges from Korea. Per capita real consumption did rise at 2.3 per cent per annum from 1911 to 1940. This was accompanied by significant structural change in which the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 76 per cent to 41 per cent (Cha and Kim, 2006) . In addition, primary school enrolment, literacy, and survival rates all increased (Kimura 1993 ).
However, the results with respect to Korea are not as clear cut as those for Taiwan Province of China. There is some evidence that farm income per household and agricultural wages may have declined (Kimura, 1993) . More importantly, when one examines the production and export of rice, Korea's critical food grain, the colonial experience appears to be more extractive than developmental. Data provided by Kim (1977) shows that, from 1912 to 1932, rice production increased by 41 per cent, but exports of rice (mainly to Japan), increased by 164 per cent. The ratio of exports to production was .04 per cent in 1912. By 1933, this had become 53 per cent. From 1918 to 1933, per capita consumption of rice in Korea declined dramatically. Output of rice grew, but extraction of rice for the Japanese market grew much faster. From this perspective, Japan seems to have behaved in a more extractive manner with respect to Korea.
How is one to reconcile this with the calculations of Cha and Kim (2006) indicating that per capita real consumption in Korea rose consistently? Their results include consumption of agricultural goods, manufactured goods and services. Thus, consumption of rice could go down, while consumption of other things would increase. Although grain consumption in general declined, the consumption of non-agricultural goods and services increased. What this seems to imply is that the growth process in colonial Korea was much more unequal in nature than in Taiwan Province of China. Since the poor relied mainly on grain consumption, the decrease in the availability of rice would have significantly affected them. This is reflected in the fact that Koreans seemed to be getting shorter, especially in the last two decades of the colonial period (Gill, 1998) .
Thus, the Republic of Korea's colonial experience appears to be of a much less developmental and much more extractive nature in relation to Taiwan Province of China. This is likely due to several factors. Successful pro-poor growth is dependent, it has been argued, on a significant backlog of agricultural technology. Such a backlog was very limited, perhaps non-existent for the Republic of Korea. This is illustrated by the fact that while agricultural production from 1920 to 1939 grew at 1.62 per cent per year, this growth was completely due to increased input usage, not increases in productivity, not increases in technology (Ban 1979) . The lack of technical innovation was the result of the fact that when Korea was colonized, its infrastructure, especially irrigation, was much less developed (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) . Also, the climatic and soil conditions were such that much of the Japanese agricultural technology could not be cheaply applied in Korea. Without the backlog of such technology, growth in Korea was much less likely to be pro-poor.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the creation of a significant technological backlog creates the opportunity to transform a low-level trap situation into a high-level equilibrium in which the poor benefit. The ruling elite extend the State's administrative structure into the rural areas to extract revenue, in return for which they must provide public services and make public investments (in order to create quasi-voluntary compliance). Taiwan Province of China illustrates this process under adverse circumstances. A colonial power became the ruling elite, and, although they did indeed undertake pro-agriculture and thus, indirectly, pro-poor policies, they were motivated by revenue concerns, and the pro-poor result was an incidental by-product of colonization. The ultimate goal of the Japanese was self-aggrandizement and the strengthening of the Japanese State and, as a result, much of the benefit of growth in Taiwan Province of China accrued to the Japanese. Thus, if under these extreme circumstances a technological backlog led to pro-poor (Taiwanese) effects, then this is strong support for the proposition argued in this paper. This is further illustrated by the fact that, after the Second World War, agriculturally based pro-poor growth led to substantial poverty reduction.
The case of the Republic of Korea shows what happens when the technological backlog in agriculture is more limited. The ruling elite still sought to extract revenue and in return did provide public services and investments in agriculture. However, the pro-poor aspect of growth was much more limited. It should be pointed out that the Japanese colonial State was going about the construction of the rural infrastructure necessary to activate the complete potential of the agricultural technology being transferred from Japan. Significant investments were being made in irrigation and other infrastructure, efforts were being made to distribute new seed varieties, and extension systems were being organized. Thus, from 1930 to 1939, the rate of growth of agricultural production jumped to almost 3 per cent a year (Ban, 1979) . It would seem that the foundations for future pro-poor growth were being established in the latter part of the colonial period of the Republic of Korea.
After the Second World War, Korea became independent. In very short order, the Korean peninsula split into North and South, the former becoming Communist. With the defeat of the Nationalist army in China, much of the Nationalist elite and army retreated to Taiwan Province of China. Thus, almost immediately, both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China became subject to severe threats. These threats were partly external-from mainland China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-and partly internal-the fear of rural peasant unrest. Thus, the ruling elite in both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China was constrained to direct significant investment into the agricultural sector, further enhancing rural infrastructure and technology. This enabled rapid agricultural growth to continue.
In addition, significant land reforms were carried out in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China (as well as Japan). This provided a firm foundation for pro-poor growth. External and internal threats to the new governing elites certainly played a role in terms of providing an environment conducive to land reform. However, it must also be pointed out that, during the colonial periods, the position of the landlords in both territories had been significantly weakened. In Korea, tenancy disputes had begun to grow in the 1920s and accelerated during the 1930s. Most of the disputes were short-run in nature involving, on average, very few participants per case. The Government of Japan, dealing with tenancy disputes at home, promulgated the Tenant Arbitration Ordinance in 1932 and the Regulation for the Establishment of Owner Operators in 1939. The former allowed parties to a dispute to submit claims to non-binding arbitration. In 1934, the Agricultural Lands Ordinance was initiated, guaranteeing a tenancy contract of at least three years, allowing tenants to propose rent reductions when crops failed and automatically renewing the rental contract as long as there were no violations (Shin, 1996) .
The result was that more than 80 per cent of tenancy disputes led to partial or complete victory for the tenant. Rental rates from 1933 to 1938 declined. These results were concentrated in the more commercialized regions of the agricultural sector (Shin, 1998) . Thus, Korean landlords found themselves facing increased resistance from peasant producers and Japanese policy increasingly tilted toward the interests of the latter.
A similar process also seems to have unfolded in Taiwan Province of China during the latter part of its colonial period. In the second decade, of the twentieth century, peasant unrest began to occur in the sugarcane-producing areas of Taiwan Province of China (sugar was produced on relatively small, peasant household farms). These tenant disputes then spread to the rice-growing regions. In response to this unrest, the Japanese initiated a programme to create tenant-landlord associations which would serve as mechanisms for settling disputes, formalizing contracts and making the contracts long-term in nature. In addition, cooperatives were established to attend to the storage and processing of rice and sugar and provide peasant farmers with credit and transportation. In 1939, rental rates were fixed while rice prices fell, undermining the position of the landlords. Thus, by the Second World War, landlords in Taiwan Province of China had been significantly weakened (Ka, 1995) .
The point is that the land reforms in the post-war period in Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea were not merely the result of external pressure and security threats. They came about also because the landlord class had already been seriously weakened during the latter part of the Japanese colonial period.
Let us now briefly examine the experience of South-East Asia. This is a vast part of Asia, with considerable variation in geographical, social, political and historical conditions. However, the initial conditions existing in much of SouthEast Asia during the process of colonization differed dramatically from that in Taiwan Province of China and the Republic of Korea during their colonial period. Excluding Java, population densities throughout South-East Asia were much lower, and land was much more abundant. In addition, many of these countries had significant natural resources to draw on. Thus, this region can be characterized as being abundant in land and natural resources and labour-scarce in relation to North-East Asia.
The vent-for-surplus theory of international trade developed by Myint (1958) has often been applied to South-East Asia. In this theory, it is presumed that, because of surplus land (natural resources), a less developed country would operate within its production possibilities. The lack of utilization of land/natural resources is due to a lack of demand for products produced via the surplus resources. Thus, when a country's economy is integrated into the global economy via trade, production would grow quite dramatically as exports requiring intensive use of land/natural resources expand, bringing into production the previously unutilized resources. Thus, trade is a vent for the utilization of surplus land and natural resources.
Thus, a sort of free growth occurs in that surplus land/natural resources are utilized to expand production without significantly reducing the production of other goods. The colonial governments in South-East Asia were actively seeking to promote such production for their home markets, but mainly it was for foreign markets. Much of this growth was due to the reproduction of traditional varieties and technology over more land. There was little effort to increase yields by developing and applying high-yield varieties (except in Java) (Booth 2007a ). Thus, agricultural growth was extensive rather than intensive.
These agricultural exports became the main source of revenue for the colonial governments in South-East Asia. This revenue was extracted via trade taxes and taxes on income generated from export production. This implies that revenue and expenditures in South-East Asia for the first four decades of the twentieth century were tightly linked to primary product export growth. "Long-run elasticities of both revenues and expenditures with respect to exports were close to unity in most parts of the region" (Booth 2007b ).
The implication of the above is fairly straightforward. Much of South-East Asia had a ready source of revenue to finance colonial government expenditures, a source of revenue which was, relative to the situation in Korea and Taiwan Province of China, easy to extract. Thus, the constraint on policy choices by the ruling elite was relatively relaxed in comparison with Korea and Taiwan Province of China. As a result, there were greater resources available and a greater temptation to use them in non-productive ways. The colonial elite was thus dependent upon a much smaller coalition in order to remain in power. Finally, these colonies did not face significant external/internal threats. Japan faced a powerful threat in the form of rising rice prices and, earlier, possible colonization which threatened to undermine the ruling coalition in the motherland.
More importantly, the revenue extraction process in South-East Asia did not involve creating an institutional structure organized in such a way as to both raise agricultural production and extract revenue. There was no institutional structure constructed on the basis of reciprocity; the State provided technology in return for which it collected revenue. This institutional infrastructure evolved in Korea and Taiwan Province of China.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUMMARY
How does a State become effective at reducing poverty? This question was answered within the context of a poverty trap model. The answers to this question that come from this model are of two types. First, one can improve the effectiveness of the poor to influence policymaking so as to be more pro-poor in its impact. This will likely involve the creation of accountable, more democratic political institutions. This is the institutional approach of modern economies. However, the means through which this is done are not well understood, and attempts to achieve this have, to date, not been very successful.
Alternatively, one can try to increase the productiveness of pro-poor policies. As the bulk of the poor in many countries live in rural areas, this would require increasing the effectiveness of agricultural policies. The productivity possible as a result of agriculturally based policies would depend on the existence of a technological backlog that can be adapted, transferred and applied. This will tend to eliminate the low-level trap in which the poor have little influence on policy and policy has little impact in terms of reducing poverty. The existence of such technological potential, while necessary for pro-poor development, is not likely to be sufficient. The ruling elite's governing coalition is likely to broaden to incorporate the rural poor if the former faces threats, both internal and internal, to their political survival. If so, the ruling elite, in search of revenue, will extend its institutional structure into the countryside, in return providing the means to access and utilize the technological backlog. The lower the availability of a technological backlog, the less pro-poor the State will be.
The main policy implication concerns sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia. Particularly in the former, the ruling elite has pursued self-aggrandizement at the expense of the poor. Attempts have been made to enhance the influence of the poor via institutional/political reform. These have had limited success. Little is likely to change, even if a technological backlog exists, as long as the ruling elite does not face internal or external threats to its political survival. However, the difficulty in much of Africa is that, even in those cases in which the political elite face internal or external threats, the technological potential for rapidly expanding agricultural productivity does not exist. This is the result of several factors. First, agricultural research in sub-Saharan Africa remains fragmented, with more than half the countries employing less than 100 full-time equivalent researchers each. Second, while research and development spending grew at 2 per cent a year in the 1970s, it dropped to 0.8 per cent in the 1990s. In 2000, Africa invested $0.70 for every $100 of agricultural output-lower than the 1981 level of $0.95. This implies that funding for developing agricultural technologies has become increasingly scarce and irregular (Beintema and Stads, 2004) . For many parts of Africa, a technological backlog does not exist.
